Post-Neo-Kantianism. What is this? by Noras, Andrzej J.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Post-Neo-Kantianism. What is this? 
 
 
Author: Andrzej J. Noras 
 
Citation style: Noras Andrzej J. (2020). Post-Neo-Kantianism. What is this? 
"RUDN Journal of Philosophy" (2020, no. 1, s. 89-98), doi 10.22363/2313-
2302-2020-24-1-89-98 
RUDN Journal of Philosophy 2020 Vol. 24 No. 1 89—98 
Âåñòíèê ÐÓÄÍ. Ñåðèÿ: ÔÈËÎÑÎÔÈß http://journals.rudn.ru/philosophy 
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 89 
История философии 
History of philosophy 
DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2020-24-1-89-98 
Research Article / Научная статья  
Post8Neo8Kantianism. What is this?  
A.J. Noras 
University of Silesia in Katowice 
Bankowa 12, Katowice 40-007, Poland  
Abstract. The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on 
the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the 
author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point 
out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism” 
and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to 
introduce this term in the classification of philosophy of the XX century with the appropriate-
ness of building the model of “Kantianism — Neo-Kantianism — Neo-Neo-Kantianism — 
Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of 
thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's 
“Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to 
be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical 
concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the se-
mantically correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood 
in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kant-
ianism, the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian 
tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of 
philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the 
two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early (classical) and late (“correct”). Neo-Kantianism shows 
the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the 
Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of 
the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or 
Hans-Michael Baumgartner. 
Keywords: Kantianism, Neo-Kantianism, Neo-Neo-Kantianism, Post-Neo-Kantianism 
© Noras A.J., 2019 
 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Норас А.Я. Вестник РУДН. Серия: ФИЛОСОФИЯ. 2020. Т. 24. № 1. С. 89—98 
90 ИСТОРИЯ ФИЛОСОФИИ 
Article history: 
The article was submitted on 12.09.2019 
The article was accepted on 31.10.2019 
For citation: Noras A.J. Post-Neo-Kantianism. What is this? RUDN Journal of Philosophy. 
2020; 24 (1): 89—98. DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2020-24-1-89-98 
Relevant to the problem is the relationship between philosophers included to 
post-neo-Kantians and neo-Kantians. Important role is played by the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant. Post-neo-Kantians descend from neo-Kantians however, they de-
rive as well from an assumption that in neo-Kantianism Kant’s philosophy has been 
wrongly interpreted. This way post-neo-Kantians reinterpret Kant, staying within 
the spirit of considerations of Königsberg thinker philosophy however perceiving 
it differently from their teachers. Therefore, it is about answering some questions 
regarding neo-Kantianism itself, the interpretation of Kant within frames of neo-
Kantianism and next about the relation between neo-Kantianism and post-neo-
Kantianism. The term of “post-neo-Kantianism” is not commonly used in philo-
sophical literature however it is not equivalent to a claim of its originality1.  
The necessity of introduction to classification of twentieth century philosophy 
a term of “post-neo-Kantianism” results from several facts. First of them is constant 
vitality of reflection over Kant’s thought, resulting in several phases being — 
broadly considered — neo-Kantianism, neo-neo-Kantianism or modern variety of 
transcendentalism appealing to Kant. It is not possible not to notice richer and richer 
knowledge of Kant’s philosophy, which results in more holistic interpretations of 
his ideas. Nothing detracts from the validity of his philosophy and even more the 
validity of transcendental philosophy, which received a powerful impulse from the 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Secondly, because of Husserl, it is important to distin-
guish post-neo-Kantianism, as thinkers included in it are often being reduced to 
phenomenology and sometimes even, as especially in the case of Heidegger — they 
are analyzed only within the flow of phenomenology. Simply a fact of differences 
appearing between post-neo-Kantians and neo-Kantians seems for many interpret-
ers sufficient argument to place them within the frames of phenomenology. These 
divisions have only organizing sense — they are made ex post, although often they 
help to capture the proper sense of a given philosophical thought. However, accord-
ing to genetic way of justifying philosophy you need to capture the source of given 
philosophical thought, to understand its proper sense. Heidegger, already men-
tioned, is a good example as understanding his philosophy is much easier, when 
you consider it within the frames of Baden neo-Kantianism, not limiting it to simply 
a thought resulting from criticism of Husserl. The more so, because Heidegger’s 
criticism of phenomenological transcendentalism is as well, or maybe even above 
all criticism of neo-Kantian transcendentalism. Heidegger proved that in the famous 
disputation with Cassirer, which took place in Davos2. It concerned neo-Kantianism 
1 Term „post-neo-Kantianism” was used for the first time in [3. P. 11]. 
2 See: Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirr und Martin Heidegger in [1]; K. Gründer, Cas-
sirer und Heidegger in Davos 1929 in [2]; A.J. Noras, Kant a neokantyzm badeński i marburski [3]. 
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and more precisely attitude towards Kant. The discussion itself highlights the post-
neo-Kantianism of Heidegger, which cannot be said about Cassirer.  
Question about post-neo-Kantianism, requires answer to a question regarding 
the neo-Kantianism itself. Here appears a number of controversies regarding how 
to classify post-neo-Kantianism, what division criterion should be adopted within 
the frames of Neo-Kantian schools etc. Classical division of neo-Kantian schools, 
distinguishing seven directions, by Traugott Konstantin Oesterreich3, was modified 
numerous times, not only because of historical reasons. Problem concerns not only 
a division into schools but distinction of two phases of neo-Kantianism being early 
neo-Kantianism and neo-Kantianism (also called classical or proper). First case is 
about neo-Kantianism, which is often called Kantian philology (Kantphilologie), 
which is in fact an attempt of rehabilitation of philosophy and getting it out of the 
impasse philosophy found herself in due to Hegel’s philosophy. Characteristic fea-
ture of early neo-Kantianism is that the problem discussed was the actuality of Kant 
in the situation of philosophy at the time. From this first phase clearly distinguishes 
neo-Kantianism (proper), which can be associated only with the philosophy of Ba-
den school and Marburg school. For the sake of justice, however, it should be added 
that, in essence, neo-Kantianism develops in parallel to early neo-Kantianism. The 
beginning of Marburg school dates back to year 1875 when Cohen took over the 
Department of philosophy from Lange and the Baden schools to 1882, when Win-
delband moved from Freiburg to Strasburg (although it is also recognized that the 
beginning of the Baden school is year 1907, when Windelband took over Heidel-
berg’s department of philosophy from Kuno Fisher) it should be mentioned that 
Windelband was lecturing in Heidelberg since 1903.  
At the same time Marburg and Baden neo-Kantianism concentrates not on the 
letter of Kant's philosophy, but on her spirit. The creator of Baden school — Wil-
helm Windelband, who in the Preface of Präludien (from 1883) posted a famous 
phrase, best captured this issue: „To understand Kant is to go beyond him” [5]. 
Therefore, it is not, and it never was, about orthodoxy towards thought of Kant, but 
about philosophizing in the spirit of Kant. Such philosophizing results from taking 
into account a science that Kant did not accounted for himself, only those after him, 
being Hegel, Dilthey and other, did it, and that science is history. In the light of the 
historical consciousness and in the light of philosophizing in the historical context 
it is not possible to philosophize in Kant’s understanding. Philosophizing can only 
be done in the spirit of Kant meaning the spirit of his critical philosophy. Hundred 
years ago, on the hundredth anniversary of the death of thinker from Königsberg, 
Windelband wrote “We are standing here, after a hundred years again asking the 
question: what should happen to criticism” [6]. The answer to such question,  
important as well today, excludes any orthodoxy in reading Kant’s thought. As a 
result, it is not a question about Kant, but about possibilities of applying his critical 
philosophy to solving philosophy’s problems. Paul Natorp, co-creator of Marburg 
school, was convinced that Kant’s thought should be read adding necessary  
                                                            
3 See Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie [4. P. 417]. 
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corrections and at the same time claimed that philosophy of Marburg school results 
from those necessary corrections. He wrote “Speaking about orthodox Kantianism 
of Marburg School never had basis; along with further development of the school 
every last semblance of justification is also lost4”. Natorp’s thesis characterizes 
however, the philosophy of Marburg school, but its sense is much wider: the 
thought of any neo-Kantian school grows from those necessary corrections of 
Kant’s philosophy. This thesis, regardless of all the consequences appearing on the 
ground of Marburg school, is important not only to understand Baden and Marburg 
school but the whole concept of neo-Kantianism (so early neo-Kantianism as well). 
Emphasizing lack of orthodoxy in interpreting philosophy of the thinker from Kö-
nigsberg shows, that this orthodoxy is hard to find in the thoughts of Kant itself. 
Open (antisystem) character of Königsberg philosopher considerations resulted in 
question about the center of gravity of his philosophy. In the response to this ques-
tion main interpretative positions were cleared — this way neo-Kantian schools 
came to life. One may be tempted to generalize the above thesis and state: Baden 
and Marburg school of neo-Kantianism differs from the early neo-Kantianism in-
sofar as the situation of philosophy, at the time when the proper neo-Kantianism is 
born, differs fundamentally from the one in which it was when neo-Kantianism 
arose (analogous to the situation, how different it was from when Kant created his 
transcendental philosophy). Different historical context causes that tasks faced by 
early neo-Kantianism and neo-Kantianism differs radically. Problem of early neo-
Kantianism is to get philosophy out of collapse caused by Hegelianism. Hopes for 
breaking the deadlock were placed in a new science which was not entirely new, 
but which was given the character of a leading discipline, namely the theory of 
cognition. Here appears the problem of theory of cognition. As it turn out the con-
cept of “theory of cognition” was not introduced by Eduard Zeller although in fact, 
in 1862, he published important for neo-Kantianism article Über Bedeutung und 
Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie. Problem is more complicated that it seems and it is 
difficult to determine clearly, who used this term for the first time. For sure, already 
in 1840 (22 years before Zeller), this term has been used by Fries’s student Ernst 
Friedrich Apelt. Even earlier, the term “theory of cognition” appeared in corre-
spondence between Christian Hermann Weisse and Immanuel Hermann Fichte, in 
1832. In the same year, separately from correspondence between Weisse und 
Fichte’s son, Friedrich Eduard Beneke has used “theory of cognition” term. Klaus 
Christian Köhnke, who devoted whole chapter of his work about the beginnings of 
neo-Kantianism states, that the “theory of cognition” term appears for the first time 
in 1819 and was authored by Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1761—1819), German 
historian of philosophy, to whom Hegel often referred, who used it in his  
Geschichte der Philosophie5.  
                                                            
4 „Die Rede von einem orthodoxen Kantianismus der Marburger Schule war niemals begründet; 
sie hat mit der Weiterentwicklung dieser Schule auch jeden fernsten Schein von Berechtigung ver-
loren“. P. Natorp. Kant und die Marburger Schule[7]. 
5 See K. Ch. Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus: Die deutsche Universitäts-
philosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus [8]. 
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Theoretical maturity of neo-Kantianism towards early neo-Kantianism lies in 
fact that the problem is not the “theory of cognition” itself, but a possibility of mak-
ing the “theory of cognition” first philosophy. In this sense neo-Kantians of both 
schools, Baden and Marburg, have no doubt that the only valuable philosophical 
discipline is the theory of cognition. However, they go further and try, within the 
frames of theory of cognition, to solve the problem they assume to be the most 
important for the philosophy and science, namely the problem of their ultimate jus-
tification (Letztbegründung). It can therefore be concluded that while the theory of 
cognition itself is a problem for early neo-Kantianism, the actual neo-Kantianism 
does not deal with the problem of science itself (scil. theory of cognition), but takes 
it for granted and focuses on the problem of ultimate justification. The term 
„Letztbegründung” is now making a career. The fact that the scientific nature of 
philosophy has been questioned in positivism results in a fundamentalist attitude of 
neo-Kantianism, additionally supported by the need to oppose historicism6. Return 
to Kant turns out to be not so much return to historical Kant but an attempt to show, 
that the ultimate justification must happen in the frames of transcendental philoso-
phy (Marburgians speak directly about the transcendental method, to which they 
reduce entire research effort on the philosopher from Königsberg). Only in this con-
text, one can read the thesis of Windelband, already mentioned before. And only 
because of that, Hermann Cohen in the preface of first edition of Kants Theorie der 
Erfahrung noted: „[...] everybody is reading his own Kant” [11]. Cohen’s “reading 
of own Kant” has nothing in common with characteristical for today philosophizing 
relativism. The thing is not that everybody can read Kant as he wants, but that eve-
rybody reads Kant according to knowledge he possess and the historical context he 
is reading Kant in. Cohen’s thesis is in a way a manifesto of neo-Kantianism due to 
fact that in chronological order it appeared before Wiendelband’s “To understand 
Kant is to go beyond him”.  
Cohen’s thesis is important because that is where lies the difference in under-
taking philosophical problems by post-neo-Kantians, philosophers coming from 
neo-Kantianism but reading Kant differently than it was done by neo-Kantians. 
From this reason, Ernst Cassirer, an outstanding student of Marburg’s neo-Kantians 
cannot be treated as post-neo-Kantian. Cassirer reads Kant a bit differently than 
Cohen and Natorp, but in fact, his philosophy does not go beyond the problem of 
ultimate justification based on the theory of cognition. Very different is case of 
another outstanding Marburg student, Nicolai Hartmann, who by some interpreters 
is considered Marburgian, but who, following Schnädelbach should be called “most 
significant Marburg renegade”7. Hartmann’s retreat from Marburg neo-Kantianism 
is made in the name of ontology, and for this reason, determines common direction 
of post-neo-Kantians research. It is a direction from theory of cognition to ontology, 
6 On historicism see H. Schnädelbach. Geschichtsphilosophie nach Hegel. Die Probleme des 
Historismus [9]; H. Schnädelbach. Philosophie in Deutschland 1831–1933 [10]. 
7 See H. Schnädelbach, „Erkenntnis der Erkenntnis”? Eine Verteidigung der Erkenntnistheorie 
[12]. 
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which made an incorporation of Husserl into post-neo-Kantianism uneasy. Husserl 
through whole his life is going into opposite direction — from ontology of Logical 
investigations (Logische Untersuchungen) to epistemology of Ideas: General in-
troduction to pure phenomenology (Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und 
phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine 
Phänomenologie) and First Philosophy (Erste Philosophie 1923/24) and to attempt 
to go back to ontology in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Die Krisis der 
europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie). 
Question that must be asked here should be: is the turn from epistemologically 
oriented neo-Kantianism to ontology made in w reference to Kant or Husserl? His-
tory of philosophy of first twenty years of twentieth century is complex and from 
today’s perspective admits right to phenomenology. Today’s perspective however 
does not coincide with perspective of the participants of the dispute, who considered 
it through the prism of neo-Kantianism8. Answering that the turn from epistemol-
ogy to ontology is made in reference to Kant one should point to aforementioned 
dispute in Davos and Heidegger’s book, which became the reason for the dispute, 
being Kant and the problem of metaphysics [14]. Heidegger, during the dispute with 
Cassirer (student of Marburg neo-Kantians) seems as someone who already long 
ago realized the end of neo-Kantianism and necessity of different that it had took 
place in neo-Kantianism — metaphysical or ontological — reading of Kant’s 
thoughts. Not getting into details of the dispute must be acknowledged that Cassirer 
as well confirm neo-Kantian provenance of Heidegger’s philosophy, when he states 
“I have to admit that even I found an neo-Kantian in Heidegger although I assumed 
it is already gone”9. Cassirer’s comment confirms the problematic historian of phi-
losophy encounters when trying to determine genetic dependencies, although it ac-
centuates the neo-Kantian sources of Heidegger’s thinking. Therefore, it seems jus-
tified to see Heidegger not as Husserl’s student but as a post-neo-Kantian — 
a thinker whose reflections stems primarily from reflection on philosophical prob-
lems based on neo-Kantianism. The work Kant and the problem of metaphysics, or 
more precisely the metaphysical interpretation of Kant turns out to have their own 
antecedentions in neo-Kantianism, but at the same time it should be remembered 
that the metaphysical direction appeared in neo-Kantianism earlier because it in-
cludes such thinkers as Otto Liebmann, Johannes Volkelt10, although Friedrich 
Paulsen and Max Wundt as well. In other words, Heidegger was not the first one to 
interpret Kant not in epistemological spirit, as it was done by neo-Kantians, but in 
spirit of metaphysics (ontology). Amongst thinkers included in post-neo-Kantian-
ism, ontological interpretation of Kant appeared already in 1921, when Hartmann 
published Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. Post-neo-Kantianism,  
8 See A. J. Noras, O relacji: Kant – neokantyzm – Husserl [13]. 
9 „Ich muß gestehen, daß ich in Heidegger hier einen Neukantianer gefunden habe, wie ich ihn 
nicht in ihm vermutet hätte“ [15]. 
10 See Friedrich Ueberwegs. Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. [4. P. 422–429]. 
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however, did not came out of nothing. Rather, it should be assumed, that the situa-
tion was slowly maturing not to withdraw from fundamentalist position as such but 
to interpret Kant differently that it took place in neo-Kantianism. In other words, 
post-neo-Kantianism is connected with attempts at a comprehensive interpretation 
of Kant being the opposition to neo-Kantianism perceived as one-sided interpreta-
tion. Research on philosophy of the Königsberg’s thinker has revealed the possibil-
ity of a metaphysical or ontological interpretations of his thoughts. For the sake of 
justice, we must add that even today we are dealing with a re-reading of Kant, which 
enriches our knowledge about his philosophy11. This confirms the historicity of 
post-neo-Kantianism. Ontological interpretation of Kant, referring primarily to his 
division into metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis, characteristic for 
post-neo-Kantianism is associated primarily in reading of his philosophy not so 
much in light of Critique of pure reason (as done by Marburgians) or in the light of 
Critique of practical reason (as done by Baden’s) but is an attempt of holistic ap-
proach to his philosophy. For post-neo-Kantians, neo-Kantianism is too one-sided. 
However, after all — paradoxically — post-neo-Kantianism refers to neo-Kantian-
ism, moreover, it can be said that neo-Kantianism determines their view on ontol-
ogy. Martin Heidegger built his fundamental ontology around the Dasein concept 
and thus avoided the characteristic for Baden research position Hiatus irrationalis 
between subject and object. However when Heidegger characterizes Dasein one 
can see the reference to Fichte and his characteristic of I (Ich)12. In Heidegger’s 
reference to Fichte, one cannot see something original, but rather only, the conse-
quence of Baden neo-Kantianism, often referred to as neo-Fichteanism. It is no dif-
ferent with Hartmann, whom within his critical ontology, has ontologized all rela-
tionships. This step, as well, can only be seen as a reference to concept of Mar-
burgians and, what Władysław Tatarkiewicz accurately called, relationism of Mar-
burg school. The problem results from a collapse — under the influence of modern 
physics — the idea of substance, which was best expressed by Ernst Cassirer in his 
Substance and Function (Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, 1910). 
Werner Flach sees concepts of Martin Heidegger and Nicolai Hartmann 
(as well as Edmund Husserl’s) in the concept of deepening the (and criticism at the 
same time) of Kant’s criticism13. Heidegger is seen as the one, who turns into the 
point of lack of transcendental-ontological dimension as a part of criticism and is 
looking for a way out through ontologization of idea of justification. Thus, 
Heidegger is replacing a transcendental-logical question by a transcendental- 
11 See for example H.-M. Baumgartner, Endliche Vernunft: zur Verständigung der Philosophie 
über sich selbst [16]. 
12 Fichte, for example, wrote “That is, they are related in so far as an object is posited; not, not. 
Again, as the object is absolutely posited, so the relation must be absolute, without ground. They are 
absolutely related means, they are posited as equals. At the same time, as sure as an object is posited, 
they are not equal. They shall be equal, but are not.” J.G. Fichte, The science of knowledge [17]. 
13 See W. Flach, Die Gegenstands- und Aprioritätsproblematik bei H. Rickert, B. Bauch und Nic. 
Hartmann. Systematische Untersuchungen zur Grundlegungsthematik der reinen Geltungslogik 
[18. P. 5]. 
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ontological one. Hartmann whereas is seen as the one who to criticism opposes total 
ontology. Thus, Flach argues that Hartmann opposes to criticism in most radical 
way14. It is worth to add, that Husserl is seen by Flach as the one, who criticize 
insufficient concept of subject and also Husserl points out to Kant the unrelated 
existence of a pure and empirical subject and a kind of transcendental-logical con-
duct in the process of justification of cognition. The question asked by Husserl to 
Kant concern — according to Flach — “how” of transcendentalism. When it comes 
to other post-neo-Kantians, Karl Jaspers retains relative autonomy, which was in-
fluenced by his path to philosophy and his initial interest in the philosophy of ex-
istence. That is why his transcendental metaphysic (periechontology) has no signs 
of connection to neo-Kantians, although it arises out of opposition to them. It should 
also be added that due to metaphysical interests, another student of Marburger 
Heinz Heimsoeth and Alois Riehl’s student — Richard Hönigswald — could be 
included in post-neo-Kantianism. In the context of growth of philosophical reflec-
tion after Kant, so critical philosophy, post-neo-Kantianism seem as another phase 
after early and classical neo-Kantianism and before neo-neo-Kantianism — con-
nected by Hans-Ludwig Ollig with thinkers like Wolfgang Cramer, Hans Wagner 
and Rudolf Zocher15. Neo-neo-Kantianism show, despite all limitations, the topi-
cality of Kant’s philosophy, showing the ongoing dispute about understanding of 
Kant’s Critique of pure reason. In Wagner’s opinion, the core of Critique of pure 
reason is transcendental dialectic16. Werner Flach, student of Wagner, refers to his 
teacher, when in spirit of his considerations wrote: “subjective side of the problem, 
almost entirely omitted by Plato, is Kant’s foreground namely at the cost of an on-
tological moment and in an accented contrast to it” [18. P. 5]. In this context neo-
neo-Kantianism basically confirms the philosophy of neo-Kantianism, bringing to 
the fore the issues of the theory of cognition, which takes place especially in the 
concepts of Hans Wagner and his student Werner Flach [18. P. 5]17. The latter pos-
itively evaluates the achievements of Hermann Cohen18. However neo-neo-Kanti-
anism in not unanimous in accenting problems of theory of cognitions, since Rudolf 
Zocher will try to show the unity of whole Kant’s philosophy. He will not therefore 
limit to problems of theory of cognition like Wagner and Flach, but will search for 
the unity of three critics, just as Marburg’s neo-Kantianism. Post-neo-Kantianism 
is important as well from the perspective of today’s research on Kant, in which such 
scientists as Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage or Hans-Michael Baumgartner 
played an important role. 
 
 
                                                            
14 See [Ibid. P. 1-3]. 
15 See H.-L. Ollig, Der Neukantianismus [19. P. 4; 94–110]. See for example R. Zocher, Die phi-
losophische Grundlehre. Eine Studie zur Kritik der Ontologie [20]. 
16 See H. Wagner, Philosophie und Reflexion [21. P. 114]. 
17 See W. Flach, Grundzüge der Erkenntnislehre: Erkenntniskritik, Logik, Methodologie [22]. 
18 See [Ibid. P. 78–79]. 
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Что такое постнеокантианство? 
А.Я. Норас 
Силезский университет в Катовицах 
Bankowa 12, Katowice 40-007, Poland 
В статье осуществляется попытка определить понятие «постнеокантианство», ис-
ходя из характера его отношения к понятию «неокантианство». С этой целью автором 
ставятся следующие задачи: охарактеризовать феномен неокантианства, указать на про-
блемы его определения, выявить актуальность термина «постнеокантианство», в особен-
ности его отношения к философии И. Канта. Автор подчеркивает необходимость введе-
ния данного термина в классификацию философии XX в. целесообразностью выстраива-
ния модели «кантианство — неокантианство — неонеокантианство — постнеокантиан-
ство», где каждый новый этап обусловливается характером рефлексирования мыслите-
лей некоторого периода над принципиальными для философии проблемами, сформули-
рованных в кантовских «Критиках». Среди постнеокантианцев в концепции автора нахо-
дятся мыслители, традиционно причисляемые к немецким феноменологам, такие как 
Э. Гуссерль и М. Хайдеггер: именно начиная с философской концепции Гуссерля можно 
говорить о появлении постнеокантианства, а семантически верная интерпретация 
Хайдеггера, по мнению автора, наиболее отчетливо понимается в рамках Баденского 
неокантианства. Исследуя феномен постнеокантианства, устанавливается необходи-
мость требования ответа на вопрос относительно предшествующей ему традиции 
неокантианства, внутри которой существует неразрешенный до сих пор в истории фило-
софии ряд противоречий относительно классификации неокантианских школ и различе-
ния двух периодов неокантианства: раннего (классического) и позднего («правиль-
ного»). Неокантианство показывает актуальность кантовской философии, выделяя не-
прекращающийся спор о понимании кантовской «Критики чистого разума». Постнеокан-
тианство играет важную роль с точки зрения перспективы современных исследований 
Канта, к которым относятся Готфрид Мартин, Манфред Брелаге или Ханс-Михаэль Ба-
умгартнер. 
Ключевые слова: кантианство, неокантианство, неонеокантианство, постнеоканти-
анство 
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